Introduction
Voting is one of the central rights or obligations of democratic citizenship, but its exercise has been largely been conditional on residence, requiring citizens to be resident to register as voters, and granting local voting rights to immigrants on this basis also.
1 Whether there are grounds for granting votes to non-resident citizens (external citizens) raises one of the hard questions for democracy: how do we define the demos? What is the fundamental ground of democratic membership? 2
The grounds for extending voting rights can be considered from two different broad perspectives.
The 'formalist' view conceives of citizenship as a unitary, all or nothing matter of legal status. This requires that all citizens are treated alike, and thus external citizens should be able to vote just as resident citizens. Conversely, on this view, voting rights for long term residents are not required -though it is legitimate to encourage long term residents to become citizens by providing reasonable access to naturalisation.
But citizenship is in fact not a unity. It is a historically evolving bundle of rights and obligations. While in the past the legal status of citizenship was necessary in order, for example, to own property or undertake public or even certain kinds of private employment, these are now less often restricted to citizens. What today distinguishes citizenship are the right (when resident) to vote and stand in national elections, the right to enter the country, the right to the state's protection when abroad, and the symbolic status of full membership. Citizenship thus provides crucial rights and protections, of which voting rights are just one.
Furthermore, the broader sense of citizenship comprises at least three different dimensions, each of which may be embodied separately, as is clear from the different terms to which they contrast. First is the rights-holding citizen, contrasted to a 'subject' who is under the command of a ruler. Second is the formal member of a particular bounded community, contrasted to an 'alien'. Finally there is the active citizen who participates in self-government, where a simple contrast term is lacking, but something like the 'passive citizen' or 'free rider' come close. These three dimensions are not inseparable. It is possible to enjoy membership rights without having participation rights (as in the case of children, or of citizens of authoritarian states); or to have participation rights without being an active citizen. Likewise migrants may participate in political movements -described as 'enacting citizenship' -without having formal membership (Isin, 2008) .
While the legal status of citizenship has traditionally been understood in terms of a single and indivisible membership of a particular territorial polity, increasing mobility and multiple interconnections across countries have been associated with the emergence of what has been called 'disaggregated' citizenship. The way in which in many countries immigrants gain some, usually local, voting rights before they are eligible for citizenship, and voting rights have increasingly been extended to citizens living abroad reflect this process. Likewise, the idea that a person should be a member of one state, and one state only, has receded, as an increasing number of states accept dual citizenship both of their own emigrants and of naturalising immigrants. This issue has attracted a number of answers in recent debates among normative thinkers. One long-standing and influential view has been to identify the 'people' with the nation, and to ground political rights in membership of the nation, expressed in terms of shared ancestry, heritage, culture or sense of belonging. But citizenship as membership of a self-governing community is distinct from, and does not depend on membership of a nation, which may be either under-inclusive or overinclusive in defining the demos. While, within a democratic state, a shared identity may support a democratic culture, it is not clear that sharing a national identity or sense of belonging itself, without any substantial connection with the state, warrants a right to a say in the future of the polity.
Thus an alternative way of defining the demos might be in terms of those who are substantially connected by contributing in some concrete way to the collective life of the polity. But this excludes those who, by dint of age or disability for example, are unable to contribute. A contribution principle is under-inclusive in defining the demos. Rather than recognising a contribution, a vote recognises the impact of law and government on citizens' lives, and gives them a chance to bring their government to account and to shape the laws determining their common future. On this basis, it has been suggested that the demos should rather comprise all those affected by the laws and policies of the state (Goodin, 2007) . While this 'all-affected' principle has some attraction, because it includes young and disabled members, and also recognises the spill-over effects of government across state boundaries, it does not provide a clear enough criterion for distinguishing between those directly and substantially affected in their life course and central interests by government and law, who should have a vote, from those further removed or affected to a lesser extent.
The normative core of democratic citizenship is that those who are subject to the authority of government should have a say in bringing that government to account and in determining their collective future. Thus, a better principle may be that thoseand only those -who are 'subjected' to government and the authority of law should be considered for inclusion in the demos. 3 Yet 'subjection' as it stands is in turn too inclusive, as it does not exclude tourists and temporary visitors. What is needed is a definition that includes those and only those who are significantly interdependent on a continuing basis in their joint subjection to the state (Honohan, 2002 (Honohan, , 2007 . One way of defining the continuing and substantial subjection to the state that warrants political rights is in terms of 'stakeholding', having long term connections and central interests, as formulated by Rainer Bauböck, who argues that 'self-governing political communities should include as citizens those individuals whose circumstances of life link their individual autonomy or well-being to the common good of the political community' (Bauböck 2009: 479) .
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If such a principle is adopted as the grounds for political rights, it may be considered to apply only to those living within the territorial bounds of the state.
Despite increasing globalisation and the spill-over effects of states' actions, while the boundaries of states still define the principal limits of their governments' writ, permanent residents in a state are still those most intensively and comprehensively subject to its laws and policies.
If only those on the territory of the state can be considered stakeholders in this sense, there is no general case for voting rights for citizens abroad. Thus Ruth Rubio
Marin concludes that external voting should not be regarded as a right of external citizens. 'as they are not directly and comprehensively affected by the decisions and policies that their participation would help to bring about even if they are likely to be affected by some of those decisions, such as those concerning remittances, nationality, and military service laws' (Rubio Marin, 2006: 53) .
It may even be argued that, as the territorial bounds of the state delimit the area of subjection, democratic principles not only do not require voting rights for emigrants, but demand their disenfranchisement (Lopez Guerra, 2005: 217 ).
Yet citizens abroad are subject to some laws and government decisions at least, especially those concerning constitutional matters and citizenship itself. David
Owen argues that it is the fact of subjection -not a matter of degree -that counts as sufficient ground for voting rights for first generation emigrants (Owen, 2009: 64) .
But emigrants do not share in the politically determined life of the country; they are not subject to its working conditions and practices, they do not in general pay taxes, their children are not brought up in its education system, and so on. Thus they are not subject to the authority of government in the same direct and comprehensive way; and it is hard to see their subjection as equivalent to that of residents. Thus, even if they are in a distinct category from others affected abroad, the subjection of citizens abroad is not enough to warrant a right to vote on all matters.
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Arguments from contribution and compulsion
There are further arguments to be considered. One is contribution-based, noting that emigrants often make a substantial financial contribution through remittances, and arguing that excluding them from voting is analogous to taxation without Furthermore, in the context of post-conflict situations or transitions to democracy, votes for those forced into exile can be seen, if only on a transitional basis, as part of a pathway to reconciliation. But emigration is more often economically-driven, and even if not wholly voluntary, provides a less clear-cut justification for voting rights than cases of forced migration. Justifying voting rights for forced exiles can be seen as a special case that is not more widely generalisable.
External voting -even if not required, is permissible or desirable?
Even if the status of external citizens differs from that of resident citizens, and there is not ground for a right to vote, there may still be reasons why it may be permissible and even desirable to give at least some categories of emigrants a political voice.
Thus Rubio Marin (2006: 134) argues that, given the increasing connections and communication of emigrants, it is permissible for them to be included by a democratic decision:
under certain circumstances a country may democratically decide to allow for absentee voting of the first generation, thereby including expatriates in the political process. They may do so in recognition of the fact that it is now easier than ever to remain connected to home state politics from abroad, and thus easier to understand the set of concrete political options that a country may face. They may also do so in recognition of the fact that many emigrants live between two countries, as well as the fact that their return is increasingly becoming a real option because being abroad no longer requires the definite severing of ties that it did in the past.
More expansively, Bauböck argues that there are good reasons to grant votes to external citizens to the extent that they can be seen as stakeholders, maintaining lifelong objective ties and interests. A key indicator is the comprehensive subjection entailed in prior residence in the state. Thus such a status can be associated most readily with those who have in the past been 'biographically subjected' (Bauböck 2009: 483) . Thus, if votes are to be granted to expatriate citizens, this should be confined to first generation emigrants. Moreover, on this view, '[e]ven for permanent first-generation expatriates, the external franchise should not be seen as a fundamental individual right but as a permissible and often also recommendable form of including transnational stakeholders in political decisions' (Bauböck 2009: 487) .
In general the grounds for democratic citizenship should be forward looking, based on future needs and responsibilities, rather than retrospective considerations.
Thus, as Bauböck acknowledges, the backward looking characteristic of first generation emigrants is only an indicator (Bauböck 2009: 481) . One important consideration here is the likelihood of return migration.
Prospects of return migration
To the extent that emigrants may return, they have a real stake in their country of origin and share future interests with other citizens. The significant extent of return migration, and the historical and current inaccuracy of the image of the one-way emigrant voyage, are now accepted. Return migration internationally is now estimated to average between 10 and 50 per cent (Global Development Network, 2010) , and is more common among first generation migrants than their descendants (Hirschman, Kasinitz, DeWind, 1999) .
On what basis might this be taken account of in a grant of votes to expatriate citizens? One suggestion, a declared intention to return, seems too subjective and consequently subject to discretionary recognition. While it is reasonable to exclude those who deny such an intention, using it as a criterion for voting requires others to make an undertaking that, even in good conscience, they may never be able to fulfil.
Rather we should conclude that significant contemporary probabilities of return warrant granting a vote to those first generation citizens who show sufficient commitment, for example, to register regularly as voters.
Additional objections: size, knowledge, double voting
Even if votes are granted to first generation citizens only, a further important question is the weight that these should be given. Especially if voting is not to be seen as a right, and the force of government affects residents more substantially, external votes do not have to carry an equal weight to those of residents. 6 The size of a potential external vote is a significant consideration. In a small state, if resident citizens can be outnumbered by the external vote, this makes external voting problematical. Bauböck identifies two possibilities here: the external vote may be potentially larger than the territorial vote and thus liable to swamp it, or it may be smaller but still capable of exerting a tipping force on the electoral result. According to Bauböck, the possibility of swamping provides a reason for counting votes in a reserved constituency, not to give special representation (as emigrants do not constitute a group needing affirmative action), but to reduce the weight of the potentially dominating external electorate. On the other hand, any group of electors may turn out to 'tip' an election, and this is not something that can be legislated against. But as a tipping power may be more likely to become a matter of concern if the external vote elects a bloc of reserved seats, Bauböck suggests that in this second context, votes are better assimilated into domestic constituencies (Bauböck 2007 (Bauböck : 2446 Who qualifies as an external voter thus varies widely among countries. Table 1 shows the range of combinations of electoral and citizenship extensibility abroad in a number of European countries. 9 Countries with the most generous system of external voting are not always those with the most generous extension of citizenship, and vice versa. On the one hand Hungary, which allows citizenship to pass by descent abroad without any restriction, provides external votes only for those temporarily abroad.
Sweden and Norway offer rather generous systems of external voting, but are moderately restrictive in the extension of citizenship abroad. Estonia and Italy are among the most generous combinations, allowing all citizens to vote, and citizenship to be passed down without restriction. 
Moderate external citizenship
Extension or retaining of citizenship beyond first generation born abroad requires registration. 
Generous external citizenship
Italy
Reserved constituencies (Postal) There would be a real danger of swamping where large emigrant populations and extensible citizenship combined with broad eligibility to vote among external citizens.
In practice, only a few European countries are estimated to be subject to potential swamping by expatriate electorates, and it has been noted that these have either been slower to introduce external voting, such as Greece and Ireland, or have limited its impact by having reserved constituencies. In most cases restrictions to certain categories of citizen make the number of external citizens eligible to vote considerably smaller than the total of external citizens, and procedural and access restrictions make the turn-out and impact of external votes lower than those of domestic voters. Exceptions to this have, however, give risen to concerns about tipping. In 2006, the first Italian legislative election in which external votes were available, there was a turn out of 38.5% of the 2.7 million registered external electorate (Mascitelli and Batiston, 2008) , which appeared to constitute a tipping force. Even after the adjustment of the numbers of seats available to emigrants, in the 2007 Croatian parliamentary elections the votes from external citizens were considered to be decisive (Ragazzi -Štiks, 2010: 14) . 10 In both of these cases all citizens are eligible, and citizenship is extensible by descent abroad, if more generously in the case of Italy than of Croatia. Thus, some of the risk of swamping and tipping arises because of the extensibility of citizenship itself.
While many countries offer votes to their citizens abroad, in cases where these would potentially exert a dominant influence on political life the scope and weight of voting tends to be contained. While an expansion of remote electronic voting would make external voting more accessible, there is no strong trend in this direction, nor towards more equal scope or weight for resident and expatriate votes, or equal access for all categories of citizen. Indeed generally low turn-out and cost and security issues are cited as reasons not to introduce or to abolish external voting except in special circumstances.
The Irish case
From Table 1 , we see that Ireland, while relatively generous in its extension of The arguments most often advanced to support extending votes to emigrants focus on three main claims. The first is the importance of recognizing the Irish diaspora. The second is that, in the past and again today, a significant proportion of emigration is involuntary, representing less a choice than the lack of economic opportunity at home, and the third, the contribution that emigrants have made and are expected to make to Irish society. Certificates of Irishness to people who wish to express their Irish identity does not quite fit the bill (Cullen, 2010) .
A second recurring argument for voting rights rests on the fact that most emigrants leave out of economic need rather than freely chosen career opportunities or other goals. It has been suggested that it is 'adding insult to injury' for these emigrants to lose their votes when they leave (Farrell, 2010 
Conclusion
The demos should consist of those whose lives are interdependent in their subjection to a common authority, and have shared future interests. National identity, contribution or emigration out of economic necessity do not provide strong arguments for granting voting rights to emigrants. The strongest ground for external voting lies in emigrants' continuing substantial connections with the polity, and a reasonable prospect of return.
Neither normative nor comparative analysis can determine the detailed requirements for external voting in any specific case. However, it can be suggested that in Ireland, the patterns of connection and rate of return constitute good grounds for extending votes to first generation emigrants, while their potential numbers warrant containing such votes in a reserved constituency.
1 This paper has benefited from helpful suggestions offered by Rainer Bauböck and other participants at the UCD Citizenship and Voting Rights in Europe, 3 December 2010.
2 By external citizens I refer to those permanently resident abroad. Citizens temporarily absent at election time present a simpler case, which can be accommodated with improved technology. Here I address only the principled normative grounds for external voting, and not practical concerns, including security and cost, which are important in decisions about implementing such provisions. See IDEA 2007. 3 Alternatively, Beckmann defines 'affected' as 'affected by law' in a way that comes close to the subjection view (Beckman, 2009) . 4 Such 'interests are genuinely political ones and emerge because individuals happen to be permanently dependent on, and jointly subjected to, established institutions of government that they can accept as legitimate if they are adequately represented in these institutions.. (Bauböck 2009: 480) 5 External voting concerns not only global diasporas, but also 'kin-minorities', blocs of co-nationals in a neighbouring state. The different considerations involved cannot be addressed in the space available here; it has been argued that, because of their potential impact on both states, full rights in their country of residence are more important. (Bauböck 2007: 2441) The issue of votes in Northern Ireland (with almost half a million Irish passport holders by 2010) may be considered to fall into this category (MacDonald 2010), but in view of the acknowledged right of those born in Northern Ireland to Irish citizenship, and the move to engage North and South in the Good Friday Agreement, itself passed on the basis of votes in both parts of the island, there may be a stronger claim for votes of some kind for Irish citizens living in Northern Ireland than in kin-states more generally. Chapter 5 of the 2002 Report of the Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution discusses this at greater length than the issue of votes for emigrants, but concludes that there should not be any extension of voting beyond the state, and notes that the decision on emigrant votes is influenced in part by the desirability that both categories of citizen should be treated similarly,. 6 Residents who will be more immediately exposed to the political decisions that they authorize through their vote have a qualitatively stronger claim to self-government than external citizens. This is why it is legitimate to differentiate external voting rights
